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I. INTRODUCTION

The American general aviation 1 industry once was one of the
great manufacturing wonders of the world. It spooled up and built
35,000 aircraft in 1946 to fight World War 11.2 After the war, general aviation continued to be popular; in 1978, nearly 18,000 gen*

Shelley A. Ewalt is an Attorney Adviser with the Department of Transportation's

Office of Hearings in Washington, D.C. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable
advice and guidance of Francis J. Mootz III, Professor of Law at the Penn State Dickinson
School of Law. Ms. Ewalt received her B.F.A. from the University of Illinois and her J.D.
from the Penn State Dickinson School of Law. The views contained herein are solely those
of the author and not those of the Department of Transportation.
1. "General aviation" refers to all civil aircraft not flown by commercial airlines or the
military. It includes everything from single-engine aircraft to multi-engine business jets
that are used for instruction, recreation, sight-seeing, business, fire-fighting, agricultural
applications, and medical evacuation missions. In 2001, the total fleet of general aviation
aircraft consisted of 219,000 active aircraft with an average age of about twenty-seven
years. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-916, GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS OF THE
INDUSTRY, RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SAFETY ISSUES 2 (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO1916.pdf [hereinafter GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001].
2. GEN. AVIATION MFRS. AS'N (GAMA), GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICAL DATABOOK
2005, at 11, available at http://www.gama.aero/dloads/20O5GAMAStatisticalDatabook.pdf
[hereinafter GAMA DATABOOK 2005].
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eral aviation aircraft were built. Between 1978 and 1994, however, general aviation manufacturing shrank to less than a tenth
of its former self. 3 The corporate offspring of the three venerable
originators of American general aviation manufacturing-Clyde
Cessna, William Piper, and Walter Beech-had become nearly
unrecognizable by the late 1980s. Cessna no longer manufactured
single-engine aircraft, Piper was in bankruptcy, and Beech had
4
closed much of its piston manufacturing line.
Several factors led to the decline, but liability costs received the
greatest amount of attention. 5 General aviation aircraft prices
began increasing sharply in the 1970s and 1980s, but the price
increases were not commensurate with new technology or safety
advances. 6 The manufacturers blamed the increasing prices in
large part on increases in the industry's liability costs. 7 Predictably, demand and orders dropped off. Driving the increase in the
8
volume and cost of litigation was the theory of strict liability.
In the 1970s and 1980s, general aircraft manufacturers landed
on the losing end of multiple high-profile aircraft crash lawsuits.
Because some of the aircraft manufacturers were self-insured,
they bore the entire cost of liability. The industry as a whole
found itself with rapidly escalating liability costs. 9 The manufacturers' claims paid and out-of-pocket defense expenses grew from

3. At its height in the post-World War II era, in 1978, 17,811 general aviation aircraft
were manufactured. Beginning in 1980, the number precipitously declined until it fell
below 1,000 units manufactured each year in 1992, 1993, and 1994. Id.
4. See GAMA's website, http://www.gama.aero/resources/productLiability/index.php
(discussing the effect of GARA on product liability).
5. The heavyweight manufacturers-Cessna, Piper, and Beech-and their primary
trade association, GAMA, can be credited with doing a superlative job of creating the impression of an industry under siege by out-of-control litigation. For a discussion of both
sides of the litigation argument, compare Scott E. Tarry & Lawrence J. Truitt, Rhetoric and
Reality: Tort Reform and the UncertainFutureof GeneralAviation, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 163
(1995), with Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation RevitalizationAct:
How Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1296
(2002).
6. GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supranote 1, at 26.
7. See Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 & the General Aviation Industry in the United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J.
301, 305-06 (1995).
8. Strict liability was given a boost by a 1963 decision of the California Supreme Court
holding manufacturers liable for products found to be defective or dangerous without requiring proof of negligence. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal.
1963) (adopting strict liability in product liability cases). The new strict liability standard
gave rise to an increasing number of product liability actions against aircraft manufacturers.. McAllister, supra note 7, at 305-07.
9. Christopher C. McNatt, Jr. & Steven L. England, The Push for Statutes of Repose in
General Aviation, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 323, 326 (1995).
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$24,000,000 in 1976 to $210,000,000 in 1986.10 In 1987, Beech,
Piper, and Cessna estimated their liability expenses ranged from
$70,000 to $100,000 per aircraft."1 As a result, insurers either
increased premiums for product liability insurancelor dropped out
of the business entirely. 12 The decreasing number of aircraft produced each year, combined with increasing liability costs, drove
the individual per aircraft insurance cost higher than the actual
production cost in some cases. 13 Unsurprisingly, production fell
ninety-four percent and jobs fell sixty-five percent between 1978
and 1988.14
The manufacturers complained that strict liability and out-ofcontrol litigation led to their financial responsibility for accidents
that were not caused by manufacturing defects. They pointed to a
study of 203 accidents generating litigation that revealed that
none of the accidents studied were judged by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to be caused by a design or manu15
facturing defect.

10. GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supranote 1, at 26.
11. Id.
12. Lloyds of London commented on the situation, saying "[wie are quite prepared to
insure the risks of aviation, but not the risks of the American legal system." James F.
Rodriguez, Note, Tort Reform & GARA: Is Repose Incompatible with Safety?, 47 ARIZ. L.
REV. 577, 579 (2005) (quoting Robert Martin, GeneralAviation Manufacturing:An Industry
Under Siege, in THE LIABILITY MAZE 478, 483-84 (Peter H. Huber & Robert Litan eds.,
1991)).
13. See generally GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Beech Aircraft studied 203 accidents at the request of the House Aviation Subcommittee of the Public Works and Transportation Committee. The average claim per lawsuit
was $10 million. Beech paid an average of $530,000 per aircraft to defend. John H. Boswell & George Andrew Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry: Putting Tort Reform to
the Test, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 533, 548 n.86 (1995) (quoting Martin, supra note 12, at 48485). It is important to note that NTSB factual accident investigation reports are admissible
at trial; however NTSB probable cause reports are not admissible. Congress expressly
limited the admissibility of probable cause reports with 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2000): "[n]o
part of a report of the [NTSB], related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may
be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter
mentioned in the report." Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27133, at
*112 (D.S.D. 2006) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2000)). This limitation protects the credibility and independence of the NTSB.
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However, factors other than "long-tail" liability 16 likely contributed to the downturn of the general aviation industry. After
World War II, general aviation was a highly cyclical business; the
18,000 aircraft built in 1978 marked a high point in production
that seriously over-supplied the market, according to some commentators. 17 Tax investment benefits to ownership of small aircraft dried up.' 8 In addition, high quality, economical kit aircraft
became available. 19 The final devastating blow came in 1991,
when Congress enacted a ten percent luxury tax on general aviation aircraft costing in excess of $250,000.20 Although the tax exempted aircraft used for business purposes and generated little
actual tax revenue, it received enormous press; contributed even
further to rising aircraft prices, and created a generally negative
perception of aircraft ownership, further resulting in decreased
demand.21
By 1994, a united and clear-voiced general aviation industry
clamored for relief and promised jobs if relief was granted. The
economic interest argument rang loudly in a Congress anxious to
reinvigorate the devastated industry and to remove legal liability
obstacles that hindered job creation. A veritable alphabet soup of

16. The term "long-tail" liability comes from the shape of a graph drawn with the value
of claims paid on the vertical axis and years since delivery on the horizontal axis. When
properly maintained, aircraft have a nearly indefinite lifespan. Thus, the "tail' of the
graph extends practically indefinitely, meaning that a non-negligent manufacturer may be
held liable under strict liability principles decades after production and delivery of the

aircraft. See Michael M. Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 745, 746 n.13 (1982). A statute of repose has the effect of cutting off the
tail of liability on the graph. Id.
17. See Tarry & Truitt, supra note 5.

18. See generally Grant F. Adamson, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the
Aviation Industry, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 191 (1987).
19. GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supra note 1, at 24.
20. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11221, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4003 (2000)), repealed in pertinent part by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13161, 107 Stat. 312, 449-53
(1993). Also taxed were other "luxuries," such as boats, cars, and jewelry over a specified
value. Id. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 repealed, among other things,
the luxury tax on general aviation. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13161, 107 Stat. 312, 449-53
(1993).
21. The luxury tax likely contributed to President George H.W. Bush's loss to President
Clinton in the 1992 presidential election. In his acceptance speech at the 1988 Republican
National Convention, Bush loudly proclaimed "read my lips, no new taxes." He later acquiesced in signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 that included taxes on
luxury automobiles, aircraft, boats, and jewelry, among other taxes. See PETER B. LEVY,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE REAGAN-BUSH YEARS 260-61 (1996).
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manufacturers and industry trade groups cooperated in the legis22
lation.
Relief came in the form of the General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994 (GARA). 23 The General Aviation Manufacturing Association (GAMA), the manufacturers, and politicians from heavily
affected states such as Kansas, worked together in drafting the
legislation and shepherding it through to passage. President Clinton signed the legislation into law in 1994, and the industry
quickly responded. Cessna Aircraft followed through on its promise to break ground on a new single-engine production facility in
Kansas. 24 From a low of 1,132 units produced in 1994, aircraft
production tripled to 3,580 units in 2005.25 General aviation
manufacturing revenue similarly grew from $3.74 billion in 1994
to $15.14 billion in 2005.26
The factors that brought GARA into being, and the resulting effect on the general aviation industry over the past twelve years,
are well discussed in a number of articles. 27 Most GARA litigation
over this time has centered on technical interpretations specific to
general aviation and to the wording of the statute. Once decided,
these technical interpretations have been generally accepted by
other courts and have been seldom re-litigated. This article looks
22. McNatt & England, supra note 9, at 326-27. Supporters included the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the International Association of Machinists, the Helicopter
Association International, the National Business Aircraft Association, and the National Air
Transportation Association. The only opposition came from the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) and consumer organizations like Citizen Action and Public Citizen.
See Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 587.
23. General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552
(1994) (reprintedas amended in 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000)).
24. Cessna built a brand new manufacturing plant for production of single-engine aircraft in Independence, Kansas following the enactment of GARA. Boswell & Coats, supra
note 15, at 556.
25. GAMA DATABOOK 2005, supra note 2, at 6.
26. Id. In 2005, a total of thirteen aircraft manufacturers based in the United States
made and delivered 2,857 general aviation aircraft. Of the total value, nearly thirty percent was exported to other countries. Id. at 13-15. Interestingly, this growth was achieved
without a decrease in individual aircraft prices. Between 1994 and 1999, the average price
of a new piston aircraft rose from $162,000 to $220,000, a twenty-five percent increase in
constant dollars. GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supra note 1, at 4. A potential reason for
the price increase is that general aviation aircraft were substantially under-priced as a
result of the over-supply of product in the early 1970s. Another reason is that manufacturers began building new safety and technology features into the aircraft, such as GPS navigation and other modern electronic aids.
27. See Tarry & Truitt, supra note 5; Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 5; McAllister,
supra note 7; Rodriguez, supra note 12; Martin, supra note 12; Boswell & Coates, supra
note 15; Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and CriticalAnalysis of the New General Aviation RevitalizationAct, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 385 (1996).
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at three cases that confronted a unique aspect of GARA. These
cases differ from substantive interpretive GARA cases in that they
focus not on technical meanings, but on the strength of protections
intended by the enactors of GARA but not delineated in the text.
While considerations of pre-trial summary judgment motions seldom make for riveting reading, these three cases show courts
struggling with whether to allow defendants a second chance to
clear the summary judgment threshold. To resolve the issue, the
courts weighed the legislative intent underlying GARA against the
protective bounds of the collateral order doctrine.
In the first case examined by this article, Estate of Kennedy v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that an aircraft manufacturer had a right to collateral review of a previously
denied summary judgment motion under GARA. 28 The decision
analogized GARA's statute of repose to statutory immunity from
suit. 29 It effectively allowed the manufacturer a re-hearing of the

substantive merits of a denied summary judgment motion.
In the second case, Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., the
Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and
held that GARA did not qualify for review under the collateral
review doctrine. 30 The court equated GARA with a statute of limi31
tations rather than total immunity from suit.

Finally, in Pridgen v. ParkerHannifin Corp., the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court acknowledged both the Ninth and Third Circuit
decisions before ultimately agreeing with the reasoning in Kennedy. 32 The divergent holdings point to the likelihood of continuing challenges as to whether GARA should be afforded collateral
review. The strength of the economic revitalization argument that
brought GARA into being gives ample support to courts that
choose to follow the Ninth Circuit and Pennsylvania decisions.
However, courts dedicated to protecting the boundaries of the collateral order doctrine will consider the granting of review to
GARA summary judgment motions an impermissible expansion of
the collateral order doctrine.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1111.
454 F.3d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 2006).
Robinson, 454 F.3d at 172-73.
905 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2006).
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THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT

How did a single piece of legislation create such a dramatic
turnaround for the general aviation industry? GARA created a
statute of repose 3 by limiting the liability of general aviation
manufacturers to the first eighteen years after delivery of a gen-

eral aviation aircraft to the buyer. 34 This addressed the main concern of the manufacturers-long tail" liability,3 5 which had made
33. In Lamb v. Volkswagenwer Aktiengesellschaft, the court explained the effect of a
statute of repose:
A statute of repose terminates the right to bring an action after the lapse of a
specified period. The right to bring the action is foreclosed when the event giving rise to the cause of action does not transpire within this interval .... Simply stated, a statute of repose is triggered once the product is delivered to its
first purchaser. If an injury results from the product after the authorized period has elapsed the victim is without recourse to the manufacturer of the
product.
631 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D. Fla. 1986). However, courts and commentators are divided
on the meaning and interpretation of statutes of repose. In some cases, they have been
generalized as a form of a statute of limitation; in other cases, they have been characterized
as creating immunity from suit. See Francis McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 582-586 (1981)
(setting forth five definitions of statutes of repose). For a general discussion of statutes of
repose in regards to product liability law, see generally David. G. Owen, Special Defenses in
Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. REV. 1 (2005).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000). The statute provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 2. TIME LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST AIRCRAFT
MANUFACTURERS.
(a) IN GENERAL-Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action
for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising
out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought
against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new
component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee,
if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in
the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other
part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or
other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which
is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the
replacement or addition.
SEC. 3. OTHER DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act(3) the term "limitation period" means 18 years with respect to general
aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and
other parts of such aircraft ....
Id.
35.

McAllister, supra note 7, at 306.
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them liable for aircraft decades after they were made. GARA's
statute of repose applied to manufacturers of general aviation aircraft, 36 to makers of individual aircraft components, and to the
manufacturers of engines and airframes. 37 In effect, GARA prevents civil litigation against the aircraft manufacturer eighteen
years after delivery.
The essential elements of the law are straightforward. Section
2(a)(1) limits the liability of the manufacturer to the first eighteen
years beginning from the date of delivery. 38 Section 2(a)(2) creates
rolling liability that restarts the period of liability for the supplier
of a replacement component, system, or part that is installed on
the aircraft. 39 For example, when a carburetor is replaced on an
aircraft, the carburetor's manufacturer is liable for an eighteenyear period following installation, but only for accidents shown to
be caused by the carburetor. 40 Since nearly every major component of an aircraft is replaced over its lifetime, the rolling liability
provision provides plaintiffs with continuing recourse against
manufacturers in the event a replacement part causes an acci41
dent.
Manufacturers can lose their GARA protections under specific
exceptions written into the statute. For example, GARA's statute
of repose does not apply when a manufacturer "knowingly misrepresented . . . or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation
36. A "general aviation aircraft" is defined in GARA as an aircraft which receives a type
certificate or airworthiness certificate from the Federal Aviation Administrator, and when
that certificate is issued, has a maximum seating capacity of fewer than eighteen passengers and is not, at the time of the accident, engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations. GARA § 2(c). 'Type Certificate" refers to authorization issued by the Federal Aviation Administration allowing for manufacture of a specific design of aircraft, engine, or
component. A type certificate is issued after an applicant presents relevant information,
including drawings, specifications, and flight performance data, showing airworthiness.
See 49 U.S.C. § 44704 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11 - 21.55 (2007).
37. In 2005, a total of thirteen aircraft manufacturers based in the United States made
and delivered 2,857 general aviation aircraft, valued at over eight billion dollars. Of the
total, nearly thirty percent was exported to other countries. GAMA DATABOOK 2005, supra
note 2, at 13-14, 17.
38. GARA § 2(a)(1).
39. Id. § 2(a)(2).
40. Since the initial enactment of GARA, courts have clarified that replacement of a
single component which is part of a larger system does not trigger a new period of liability
for the entire system. For example, by replacing a fuel filter the party does not restart the
clock for the entire fuel system. See Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS
2894 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003).
41. Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27133, at *16-17 (D.S.D.
2006) (quoting Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 131-32 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000)).
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Administration, required information that is material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such
aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part,
that is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly
42
suffered[.]"
The wording of the statute requires more than mere negligence
of design to justify a cause of action. 43 In order to prevent GARA's
protective umbrella from attaching, claimants must plead facts
that establish either that GARA does not apply or that their claim
falls within one of the exceptions.
The language of GARA is short, but its ramifications have been
far-reaching. The clarity of the text makes the initial claimpleading stage particularly important. Courts have declared that
the eighteen-year timeframe begins when the aircraft is first delivered, even if the first delivery was not to a general aviation customer. 44 Additionally, plaintiffs must specifically allege misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding in order to invoke GARA's
exceptions. Thus, the statute is designed to make it easy to determine at the commencement of litigation whether a plaintiff
may pursue a claim or whether the eighteen-year statute of repose
bars the claim. Determining whether a claim moves forward is
therefore particularly suited to adjudication on a summary judgment motion. This is exactly what GARA's promoters had in
45
mind: certainty as to liability.

By using a classic statute of repose, GARA addressed the manufacturers' primary goal of foreclosing indefinite liability. Since
aircraft have a nearly unlimited lifespan when cared for properly,
42. GARA § 2(b)(1). The full text of that subsection is as follows:
(b) EXCEPTIONS.-Subsection (a) does not apply(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove,
and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to a type certificate or
airworthiness certificate for, or obligations with respect to continuing
airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, or
other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Avia-

tion Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation
Administration, required information that is material and relevant to the
performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the
component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related

to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered[.]

Id.
43. Sheesley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27133, at *28.
44. See Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding first delivery to U.S. military starts the clock running on GARA).
45. For a detailed review of the legislative history and discussions pursuant to GARA's
enactment, see McNatt & England, supra note 9; Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 5; Tarry &
Truitt, supra note 5.
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some commentators believe that the real effect of GARA is to shift
responsibility from the initial aircraft manufacturers to manufacturers of replacement components. The counter-argument is that
the original manufacturer often makes the replacement parts and
thus remains liable if the part proves to be defective within eighteen years of delivery. In the first eight years after GARA's enactment, a variety of cases resolved important points of GARA's coverage and technical details inherent to aircraft litigation. 46 By
creating a defined period of liability, the manufacturers, suppliers,
and their insurers were better able to pin down the price of potential liability costs.
After GARA's enactment in 1994, the general aviation industry
began a long, steady climb back to economic health. Although
many commentators have pointed out that the industry's return
was also fostered by an excellent economic climate, by technological advances in aircraft design, and by a strong market for American corporate aircraft, it is generally acknowledged that GARA
47
was primarily responsible for the revitalization.
In 2002, the aircraft manufacturers gained an additional protection not likely foreseen by GARA's promoters and legislators. In
Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that an aircraft manufacturer's summary judgment motion, denied at the trial court level, could be immediately appealed
under the collateral order doctrine. 48 In most cases, the denial of
a summary judgment motion does not qualify as a final decision
because, far from ending the litigation, it is an order allowing the
litigation to proceed. 49 The Ninth Circuit decision permitted, for

46. E.g., Lyon v. Augusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001) (GARA applied retroactively to an accident that occurred prior to GARA's passage, where the suit was filed after
enactment of GARA); Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155, 1156-57 (9th
Cir. 2000) (revised flight manual held to be new "system ... or other part[,]" allowing plaintiff to proceed with claim); Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 919 F. Supp. 340,
(E.D. Cal. 1996) (GARA expressly stated that it did not apply to actions "commenced" prior
to enactment. The court construed this clause to mean it was applicable to actions commenced after enactment.); Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (defendant who acquired
product line of carburetor from an original manufacturer stood in shoes of manufacturer
and received protection from GARA).
47. For a detailed discussion of the economic forces contributing to general aviation's
decline, the enactment of GARA, and its resurrection, see Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 5;
McAllister, supra note 7. The GAO's 2001 report on the status of general aviation credits
GARA with primary responsibility for returning the industry to economic health. See generally GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supra note 1.
48. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
49. Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2003)).
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the first time, collateral review of an interlocutory motion in the
50
context of a GARA case.
III. THE COLLATERAL REVIEW DOCTRINE
The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the general rule
that only final decisions of the court may be appealed. 51 A final
decision, or order, 52 is normally not deemed to occur "until there
has been a decision by the district court that ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." 53 The purpose of the final decision rule is to prevent
piecemeal appeals, 54 to limit interruptions to the litigation process, 55 and to further judicial efficiency by limiting the judicial
docket. 56 The final decision rule recognizes the deference that an
appellate court owes to the trial court as the judicial body responsible for developing the facts and identifying the legal issues. 57
While the final decision rule is codified in federal law, the statutes
do not define the meaning of "final decision." The absence of a
statutory definition has left the meaning of final decision and the
collateral order doctrine to develop through a patchwork of federal
and state court decisions.
The United States Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., determined that certain types of court orders
were immediately appealable, even though the litigation had not

50. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112 (granting, for the first time, collateral review over summary judgment in the broader context of product liability suits).
51. The "final decision rule," or "final judgment rule," is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2000) and provides in pertinent part: "[tihe courts of appeals.., shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... " Id.
52. Rule 313 and Pennsylvania courts use the phrase "final order" to indicate final
court orders. Various other federal courts use the phrases "final order" and "final decision"
interchangeably to refer to the same concept. For the sake of consistency, "final decision" is
used throughout this article. Functionally, there is no different between Pennsylvania's
use of "final order" and other courts' use of "final decision." See generally PA. R. APP. P. 313;
Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003); Robinson, 454 F.3d 163.
53. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989).
54. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (The final decision rule
prevents litigation interruptions by "piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions
which do not terminate the litigation.").
55. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984) (ability of litigants to harass opponents is reduced by final judgment rule); accord Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (final judgment rule prohibits obstruction of just claims).
56. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
57. California v. Harvier, 700 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1983) (Rather than being a
mere formality, the final judgment rule embodies a substantive policy that legal issues
initially should be developed before district courts.).
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reached a final conclusion. 58 These intermediate, appealable decisions became known as "collateral" decisions. The collateral order
doctrine, reaffirmed and explained by the Supreme Court in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,59 called for a "practical construction" of the final decision rule, establishing "a narrow
class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in
the interest of achieving a healthy legal system nonetheless be
treated as final." 60 The court explained the three elements of the
collateral order doctrine as "[1] decisions that are conclusive, [2]
that resolve important questions completely separate from the
merits, and [3] that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment in the under61
lying action."
In Johnson v. Jones, the Supreme Court weighed the pros and
cons of granting collateral review over nonfinal decisions:
[28 U.S.C. § 1291] recognizes that rules that permit too many
interlocutory appeals can cause harm. An interlocutory appeal can make it more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job-supervising trial proceedings. It can threaten those
proceedings with delay, adding costs and diminishing coherence. It also risks additional, and unnecessary, appellate
court work either when it presents appellate courts with less
developed records or when it brings them appeals that, had
the trial simply proceeded, would have turned out to be unnecessary.
...[S]ometimes interlocutory appellate review has important
countervailing benefits. In certain cases, it may avoid injustice by quickly correcting a trial court's error. It can simplify,
or more appropriately direct, the future course of litigation.
And, it can thereby reduce the burdens of future proceedings,
62
perhaps freeing a party from those burdens entirely.
Johnson concerned a civil rights action brought by a diabetic
person against five police officers for using excessive force to arrest him for public drunkenness when, in fact, he was having an
58. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
59. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 865 (1994) (upholding
and explaining the federal collateral order doctrine first established in Cohen).
60. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 865.
61. Id. at 867.
62. 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).
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insulin seizure. 63 Three of the officers claimed "qualified immunity" as public officials and moved for summary judgment based
on a defense of lack of evidence. 64 When the district court denied
their motion, the officers immediately appealed. The Seventh Circuit refused to hear their appeal because the underlying summary
65
judgment order did not constitute a final decision.
Recognizing a circuit split on the underlying question considered by the Seventh Circuit-whether "evidence insufficiency"
claims made by the officers claiming "qualified immunity" constituted an appealable order-the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 66 The Court reiterated and explained the three Cohen factors. The first element--decisions that are conclusive-meant
"that appellate review is likely needed to avoid . . . harm. ' 67 The
second element-separability-meant "that review now is less
likely to force the appellate court to consider approximately the
same (or a very similar) matter more than once ...."68 The final
element-effective unreviewability-meant that "failure to review
69
immediately may well cause significant harm."
The Court found that the lower court ruling on the sufficiency of
evidence did not satisfy the three elements. 70 Although the officers' ultimate defense rested on "qualified immunity," the Court
found the underlying evidence insufficiency claim to be intertwined too closely to the underlying case, thus failing the second
Cohen test. 7 1 However, a claim of immunity, the Court acknowledged, even when intertwined with the merits, could raise a significantly different issue, thus qualifying for collateral review. 72 It
distinguished between final decisions focused significantly on
whether or not genuine issues of fact existed from the purely legal
principle of whether qualified immunity was available.
A variety of legal issues have been found to qualify for review
under the collateral order doctrine. Immunity claims, such as
qualified immunity in Johnson, as well as sovereign immunity,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 311.
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
Id.
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have been held to qualify. 73 Defendants in criminal trials have
successfully argued this point to obtain review of substantive and
74
procedural issues.
Generally, the collateral order doctrine has not been employed
in products liability actions, but the Ninth Circuit determined in
2002 that the underlying nature of GARA-as a statute of repose-made any claim brought under its provisions similar to an
immunity case, thus allowing for collateral review. 75 In 2006, the
Third Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and held that
a denial of a defendant's summary judgment motion in a GARA
case did not qualify for review under the collateral review doctrine. 76 The opposite conclusions reached by the Ninth and Third
Circuits flow from their different approaches to statutory interpretation. Shortly after the Third Circuit decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court issued a third GARA collateral review decision
that attempted to navigate between the reasoning of the two circuit courts. 77 Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided
with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, holding that GARA could be
reviewed under the collateral order doctrine. 78 Consequently,
there is a lively debate in the courts about the use of the collateral
order doctrine in aircraft product liability cases, and also regarding the intended strength of GARA's protective statute of repose.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision weaves between the
Ninth and Third Circuit decisions while also adding substantial
detail by focusing on the difficulties inherent in aircraft crash litigation due to the intertwining of facts and law.
These competing interpretations of the same statute are likely
to fuel uncertainty as other jurisdictions consider this issue. The
circuit split asks whether GARA should qualify for collateral review, but it is putting the question too broadly to ask whether
GARA as a whole qualifies for collateral review. GARA litigation
73. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314; Farricielli v. Holbrook, 215 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2000)
(discussing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); Transatlantic Shiffahrtskontor
GmbH v. Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing sovereign
immunity under Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act); Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that denial of summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity
is an appealable collateral order if it resolves dispute concerning issue of law).
74. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (reduction of bail).
75. Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir.
2002).
76. Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 172-74 (3d Cir. 2006).
77. See Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2006), adhered to on reargument, 916 A.2d 619 (Pa. 2007).
78. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 434.

Winter 2008

Collateral Review of GARA Cases

cases encompass principles of law that are nearly always intertwined with underlying facts. This leads to an inevitable conflict
between those courts that view GARA as a grant of immunity and
those that view the intertwining of fact and law as precluding a
traditional narrowness of the collateral order doctrine.
Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter - The Ninth Circuit Establishes
the Use of CollateralReview of GARA

A.

Eight years after the passage of GARA, the Ninth Circuit was
confronted with a novel defense maneuver. The accident leading
to the dispute involved a TH-1L helicopter, 79 popularly known as a
"Huey," originally delivered to the U.S. Navy in 1970.80 The accident occurred in 1996, twenty-six years after the helicopter's delivery to the military, when it broke apart in mid-air and
crashed.81 The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident as
[flatigue failure of the vertical stabilizer spar cap and subsequent loss of the rotorcraft's vertical stabilizer. Factors include inadequate inspection or trouble-shooting of the aircraft
tail cone and vertical stabilizer at and after the time sheetmetal skins were stop-drilled and rivets were replaced, and
repetitive cycles associated with helicopter logging opera2
tions.8
In other words, a structural failure in a key component-the tail
boom-caused the helicopter to break apart in mid-flight. The
twenty-six year span between delivery and accident was clearly
long enough to qualify for GARA's protective statute of repose.
However, an interesting technical definition of "aircraft" put the
age of the helicopter into question.
The aircraft was delivered to the Navy in 1970; the Navy sold
the Huey as military surplus in 1984.83 Aircraft delivered to the
79. Helicopters are considered aircraft for GARA purposes. GARA § 2(c), 49 U.S.C. §
40101 note (2000). GARA's eighteen-year limitation period refers to general aviation aircraft, meaning "any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certificate has
been issued by the Administrator of the [FAA]." Id.
80. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
81. Id. at 1109.
82.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB), BRIEF OF ACCIDENT REPORT,

No. SEA97LA025, at 2 (Aug. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=SEA97LAO25&rpt=fi.
83. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1111. Military aircraft (with certain exceptions such as
fighter aircraft) are commonly sold as surplus to the civilian market.
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U.S. military have neither a type certificate nor an airworthiness
certificate.8 4 They are classified as "public aircraft," and defined
under the Code as "used only for the United States Government."8 5 Thus, the helicopter did not acquire a type certificate or
airworthiness certificate until 1984 when it was transferred to
civilian service.8 6 Since the crash occurred in 1996, only twelve
years had elapsed between the time the aircraft acquired its type
87
certificate and the crash.
At trial, both parties made cross-motions for summary judgment.8 8 Defendant Bell Helicopter argued that GARA barred the
claim because the accident occurred twenty-six years after original
delivery.89 The district court rejected the GARA defense. 90 It
based its holding on state product liability law, holding that under
Washington state product liability law, the manufacturer had an
ongoing duty to warn of design defects.91 The court then proceeded to find that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the defendant did in fact warn, and whether the design
defect proximately caused the crash. 9 2 This ruling allowed the
93
suit to go forward.
Bell Helicopter appealed. 94 Even though the ruling did not
qualify under the traditional definition of a final decision, Bell argued that appellate review should be granted under the collateral
order doctrine. 95 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit granted
review. It acknowledged that, in Digital Equipment Corp., the
Supreme Court characterized the collateral order doctrine as a
narrow exception that should never "swallow the general rule" of a
single appeal. 96 However, the court found that Bell Helicopter
met the stringent circumstances set forth by Cohen and Digital
Equipment Corp.97 In short order, the court found that the first
two elements of the collateral order doctrine were satisfied:

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1112.
Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2000) (defining "public aircraft").
Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112.
See id.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110.
Id.
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In the present case it is clear that the first two factors are
met. The district court's order is conclusive, and, like qualified immunity accorded to government officials, the applicability of the GARA statute of repose is an important question
which is resolved completely separate from the merits of the
litigation.98
As to the third element, the court held "that the GARA statute
of repose meets the third condition as well because it creates an
explicit statutory right not to stand trial which would be irretrievably lost should Bell Helicopter be forced to defend itself in a
full trial."99 In equating the statute of repose to an explicit right
"not to stand trial," the court offered as support the language of
the statute stating that "no civil action ... may be brought . . . if
the accident occurred-(1) after the applicable limitation period..
"100

In dissent, Judge Paez stated that the majority's decision
"impermissibly expand[ed] the collateral order doctrine."10 1 He
did not see in GARA an essential "right to be free from the burdens of trial or that the defense would be irretrievably lost absent
an immediate appeal."' 0 2 First, he disagreed with the majority's
comparison of the statute of repose to qualified immunity that
would result in a right to be free from trial. 10 3 Judge Paez concluded that GARA was more like a statue of limitations than a
right to immunity from suit. 104 Statutes of limitations, as his dissent noted, had uniformly been held not to create immunity from
suit.105 He also stated that the defendant did not satisfy the third
Cohen condition-that the appealed-from order must be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment."'1 6 Judge
Paez pointed out that the effect of the decision was to give general

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citing GARA §2(a)).
Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1113 (Paez, J., dissenting).
Id.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 1115.
105. Id. at 1114 & n.2 (citing United States v. Garib-Bazain, 222 F.3d 17, 18 (1st Cir.
2000); United States v. Pi, 174 F.3d 745, 750 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d
1088, 1090 (2d Cir. 1993); Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Rossman, 940 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1991)). It is worth noting that except for
Powers v. Southland Corp., the cases that Judge Paez cited to were all criminal cases. The
collateral order doctrine is seldom used in non-criminal cases.
106. Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112-13 (Paez, J., dissenting)
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aviation manufacturers the additional and unforeseen tool of
piecemeal litigation to slow litigation. 107
The two-judge majority did not discuss Johnson, which explained that unreviewable meant that a failure to review immediately may cause significant harm. At first reading, Johnson supports the majority's holding. A defendant in a complex aircraft
crash suit will bear large costs in time and money, and it is precisely the function of GARA to shield manufacturers from these
costs unless an exception is met. However, the problem is that the
very nature of aircraft crash litigation-fact-intensive, discoverydependent, time-consuming, and complex-makes it necessary to
determine GARA's applicability and its exceptions on a case-bycase basis. Case-by-case scenarios are specifically rejected by the
Supreme Court's collateral review methodology. "[T]he issue of
appealability under the [final decision rule] is to be determined for
the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the
chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted ....10
In the final analysis, the Kennedy court made a sensible interpretation that GARA's eighteen-year statute of repose was meant
to begin rolling when the aircraft was initially put into service.
The court held that the fact that an aircraft initially began in government service, and therefore did not initially receive an FAA
type certificate, should not delay the start of GARA's protections. 10 9 In this respect, the substantive holding is in line with
what the promoters and legislators envisioned.
However, in
achieving this result, the court expanded the collateral review doctrine beyond what the Supreme Court intended in Cohen, Digital
Equipment Corp., and Johnson.
B.

Robinson v. Hartzell - The Third CircuitRejects Collateral
Review of GARA

In August 1999, two accidents that occurred only two weeks
apart gave rise to litigation concerned with collateral review of
GARA. The first accident led to a case in the Pennsylvania state
court system, Pridgen v.Parker Hannifin Corp.,110 and was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The second accident
107.
108.
added
109.
110.

Id.
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (emphasis
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1112 (majority opinion).
905 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2006).
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led to litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc.,"'
and was eventually appealed to the Third Circuit.
The events of the Robinson accident of August 15, 1999, are described in the NTSB factual report:
[T]he pilot reported that about 20 minutes into the flight, he
heard a loud bang, then saw an object go by the windshield.
The airplane started to shake so badly that the door popped
open, and oil appeared on the windshield. The pilot had difficulty reaching the mixture to shut the engine down; however,
after engine shutdown, the shaking ceased, and the pilot performed the forced landing [on] a hilly field. 112
In the course of the forced landing, the pilot and passenger were
seriously injured. The passenger "suffered a broken back, breast
bone, and left foot, while [the pilot] fractured his spine, rendering
him a paraplegic." 113 The NTSB stated the probable cause of the
accident as "[p]ropeller blade separation, resulting from fatigue
cracking initiated by intergranular corrosion. A factor was the
lack of propeller blade corrosion inspection requirements." 11 4 In
other words, the propeller broke apart in-flight, and the pilot's
actions were not found to be the cause of the accident.
The plaintiffs in Robinson brought their case under the misrepresentation exception of GARA. They asserted that the defendant
made material misrepresentations in obtaining the type certificate
for the propeller that broke apart in-flight. 1 5 The defendant
moved for summary judgment, alleging that GARA barred the
claim since the accident occurred more than eighteen years after
delivery, and that the exception did not apply. "1 6 The district
court rejected the defendant's motion. 117 Citing Kennedy for the

111. 454 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2006).
112. NTSB, FACTUAL REPORT, No. NYC99LA202, at 1 (accident date Aug. 15, 1999),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC99LA202&rpt=fa.
The "mixture" referred to in the report controls the fuel to air mixture in the engine. A typical piston aircraft engine is shut down by "pulling the mixture," which stops the flow of fuel to the
engine.
113. Robinson, 454 F.3d at 165.
114. NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT REPORT, No. NYC99LA202, at 1 (Aug. 13, 2001), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC99LA202&rpt=fi.
115. Robinson, 454 F.3d at 165. A key component, such as a propeller, receives a separate type certificate from the FAA.
116. Id. at 167.
117. Id.
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right to collateral review, the defendant appealed, and the case
was heard by the Third Circuit. 118
The Third Circuit held that the defendant's appeal did not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. 119 Referencing
Judge Paez's dissent from Kennedy,120 as well as other Third Circuit cases, the court expressed its reasoning in four primary
points. 121 First, it equated the interests protected by GARA to a
22
statute of limitations rather than a grant of qualified immunity, 1
concluding that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly characterized
GARA's statute of repose as immunity from suit. 123 It found the
statutory language, "no civil action . . . may be brought," to be
similar to the statutory language in the federal default statute of
limitations.' 24 While acknowledging differences between statutes
of limitations and statutes of repose, the court concluded that the
purpose underlying both is to "protect private parties from liabil25
ity on stale claims."1
Second, the court distinguished the use of collateral review in
other immunities cases that involved immunity for public officials,
since those decisions are grounded in the public policy of ensuring
that public officials "are not deterred from vigorously carrying out"
their duties.126 Finding no clear statutory immunity from suit in
GARA's text, the court concluded that there was no correlating
public policy rationale to grant immunity to a private defen27
dant. 1
Third, the court found that GARA was not a statute of pure immunity, as evidenced by the existence of the exceptions within the
statute. 128 Noting that the misrepresentation exception renders
118. Id. at 167-68, 172.
119. Id. at 173-74.
120. Robinson, 454 F.3d at 172-73 (citing Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1114-15 (Paez, J., dissenting)).
121. Id. at 173-74.
122. Id. at 172-73.
123. Id. at 172.
124. Id. Compare GARA § 2(a), 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000) ("no civil action... may
be brought") with 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2000) (setting forth the statute of limitations and
stating: "a civil action... may not be commenced...").
125. Robinson, 454 F.3d at 173. However, there is much literature distinguishing between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation in regard to product liability actions.
Professor Francis McGovern explains that "analytical difficulties" are encountered unless
the meaning of a statute of repose is clear. See McGovern, supra note 33, at 582. He sets
forth five definitions comparing and contrasting statutes of limitation with statutes of
repose. Id. at 582-86.
126. Robinson, 454 F.3d at 173.
127. Id.
128. Id.

Winter 2008

Collateral Review of GARA Cases

197

GARA completely inapplicable to a case, the court found that no
comparable exceptions existed in the law governing public official

immunity. 129
Finally, the Third Circuit harmonized its decision with Kennedy
by distinguishing the present case as involving a question of
GARA's law intertwined with a decision on the merits. 130 The
lower court had found a genuine question of fact as to whether the
defendants had misrepresented or concealed material information
concerning the certification of the propeller, whereas the Kennedy
court had faced the purely legal issue of what date triggered the
GARA limitations period. 13 1 The court noted that even if GARA
envisioned a form of qualified immunity, the application of a statute of repose was unavoidably intertwined with a decision on the
merits, yielding a factual dispute over the cause of action.132 Referencing the Cohen factors, the court suggested the intertwining
issues of law and fact failed the second factor-separability-and
33
thus did not qualify for review. 1
The Third Circuit did not specifically state whether the first and
third Cohen factors-a decision that is conclusive and is effectively
unreviewable upon appeal-were met. Nevertheless, it implied
that a decision based on GARA could qualify for collateral review
when it involved only an issue of law. Technically, the holding did
not reject Kennedy outright. However, the reasoning strongly
suggests that the Ninth Circuit's comparison of the statute of repose to immunity from suit was incorrect and would not support
34
the third Cohen prong of a decision not reviewable upon appeal. 1
C.

Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin - The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Upholds CollateralReview of GARA

When the Third Circuit issued its decision in Robinson, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was still considering the appeal in
Pridgen. The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred when
a fifty-three year old airline transport-rated pilot 135 was returning
129. Id.
130. Id. at 173-74.
131. Robinson, 454 F.3d at 174 (citing Kennedy, 283 F.3d 1107).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 173-74.
134. Id. at 172.
135. For pilots, there is no higher rating granted by the Federal Aviation Administration. An airline transport pilot (ATP) may act as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in air
carrier service. The rating is held by less than twenty-five percent of all licensed pilots.
GAMA DATABOOK 2005, supra note 2, at 30.
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from Oshkosh, Wisconsin to his home in a Piper aircraft that carried four friends. 136 The group stopped to refuel at Youngstown
Airport, near North Lima, Ohio. After refueling, the aircraft departed. The NTSB factual report recorded the statement of the
employee who refueled the Piper. While the aircraft was still on
the ground, "the tail was almost touching the ground, and ...the
airplane 'was nose high."' 13 7 After it took off, the airplane "was
having a hard time climbing out, and [it] was hanging on the prop
and mushing its way out. I saw [it] take off, make a 180-degree
turn to enter the downwind, and lost sight of him."'13 8 Another
witness who observed the Piper stated it "just couldn't get any
elevation... Just before going down [it] was banking left." 139 The
aircraft hit the ground in a cornfield about one-half statute mile
from the airport.140 Four of the five people onboard were killed;
the fifth was seriously injured, but survived the accident. 141
The immediate post-accident investigation by the NTSB focused
on weight and loading of the aircraft. The group's luggage, stored
in the forward and aft baggage compartments, had shifted upon
impact, so the NTSB was unable to determine its exact original
location.1 42 However, the NTSB did determine that regardless of
the exact location of the baggage, the total weight of the aircraft
was 3,390 pounds compared to a maximum allowable gross weight
of 3,400 pounds. 143 The loading of the aircraft was similarly near
maximum allowable parameters. The NTSB calculated the center
of gravity to be between 94.4 and 95.2 inches aft of datum, 144 depending upon the precise location of the luggage. The aircraft's
type certificated design allowed for a range between 91.4 and
95.5.145 Thus, with regards to both weight and balance, the aircraft was within the operating parameters, but not by much. An
aircraft operating so close to the edge of its design weight and balance parameters would have required the pilot to maintain precise
136. NTSB, FACTUAL REPORT, No. NYC99FA187, at 1 (accident date Aug. 1, 1999),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC99FA187&rpt=fa.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at la.
141. NTSB, FACTUAL REPORT, No. NYC99FA187, supra note 136, at 1.
142. Id. at lb.
143. Id.
144. The "datum" is a reference point used to create guidelines for loading an aircraft.
Every aircraft is designed to be loaded within a particular distance from the datum in order
to properly balance the aircraft in flight.
145. NTSB, FACTUAL REPORT, No. NYC99FA187, supra note 136, at lb.
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control of airspeed and pitch. The NTSB concluded the probable
cause of the accident was "[t]he pilot's loss of control of the airplane during a turn. Factors include the pilot's failure maintain
sufficient airspeed, and his failure to maintain the airplane in
proper trim."'146 Thus, unlike Robinson, the NTSB concluded that
the pilot's actions were a cause of the accident.
Pridgen'scomplex procedural history may have played a role in
the ultimate outcome. The plaintiffs suit was based on two
claims: first, that an engine defect caused the crash, and second,
that defendants Textron, Inc. and AVCO Corp. had made material
misrepresentations in obtaining the original type certificate. 147
Defendants' summary judgment motions argued that more than
eighteen years had elapsed since installation of the engine and,
thus, that the claim was barred by GARA. 148 Additionally, the
defendants argued that they did not manufacture or supply any of
the allegedly defective parts which were replaced on the aircraft
within eighteen years prior to the accident. 149 The trial court denied the defendant's summary judgment motions. 150 Citing Kennedy, the defendants appealed under the collateral order doctrine. 151
In response, the plaintiffs argued that although the defendants
did not manufacture or supply the parts in question, the defendants held the type certificate 52 for the model of engine on the
aircraft, supplied specifications for installation and replacement,
and marketed such parts.153 Being the holder of the type certificate, the plaintiffs argued, meant GARA did not protect the defendants because of the underlying design defect claim.154 The plaintiffs also maintained their misrepresentation claim. 155
146. NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT REPORT, No. NYC99FA187 (Dec. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC99FA187&rpt=fi.

147.

Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 2006), adhered to on rear-

gument, 916 A.2d 619 (Pa. 2007). The opinions of the Court of Common Pleas and Superior

Court in Pridgen were not published; therefore, all references are to the opinion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
148. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 425.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 426.
151. Id. at 426-27.
152. Id. at 425-26. For an explanation of "type certificates," see supra note 36.
153.

Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 425-26. It is common practice for a manufacturer to purchase

another manufacturer, a specific aircraft model, or simply a particular line of components.
The purchasing manufacturer becomes the holder of the "type certificate" in the transac-

tion, even though it did not manufacture the components made prior to the purchase. The
concept is akin to one who holds a patent in that the patent right can be sold or transferred.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 426.
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The trial court again ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both
claims. 156 Citing Pennsylvania's collateral order doctrine 157 and
Kennedy, the defendants appealed to the appellate level. 158 As
required by Pennsylvania's Rules of Appellate Procedure, 159 the
trial court filed its opinion setting forth the reasons for its holding,
but rather than giving substantive reasons for its denial of the
defendants' motions, the court cited the procedural principle that
the order did not qualify as a collateral order with a right of appeal. 160 The court stated "the collateral order doctrine should be
narrowly construed to avoid undermining the general rule authorizing appellate review of only final [decisions], and to prevent litigation from being delayed by piecemeal review of trial court decisions[,]" and held that the defendants did not satisfy the three
elements of Pennsylvania's collateral order rule. 161 Thus, the
court focused on the preclusive effects of the collateral review doctrine and not on the merits of the motion. This later proved to be
a major point of frustration for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in its review of the case as it remanded the case several times to
determine the lower courts' reasoning on the merits.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court granted and heard defendant's discretionary appeal, but ultimately affirmed the trial
court. 162 Defendants sought a second discretionary appeal, this
time to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which granted the appeal and then remanded to the Superior Court to determine

156.
157.

Id.
Rule 313 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure reads in full:
(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of
an administrative agency or lower court.
(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the
main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
PA. R. APP. P. 313. Rule 313 was promulgated by the Pennsylvania Appellate Court Procedural Rules Committee in 1992; the committee cited to Pennsylvania and federal cases and
stated the rule to be "a codification of existing case law with respect to collateral orders."
77 PA. B. ASS'N. Q. 145, 150 (2006) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949); Pugar v. Greco, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978)).
158. Pridgen,905 A.2d at 426.
159. Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure reads in pertinent
part: "Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to
the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall
forthwith file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order ....
PA. R. APP.
P. 1925(a).
160. Pridgen,905 A.2d at 426.
161. Id. at 427.
162. Id. at 428.
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whether the collateral order doctrine applied. 163 The Superior
Court answered that it had already considered and rejected the
164
collateral order doctrine, and once again quashed the appeal.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted defendant's third discretionary appeal and remanded again to both lower courts to
65
supply supporting rationale for their decisions. 1
The Superior Court considered the defendants' argument that
GARA barred the plaintiff-appellees' underlying claims, and acknowledged Kennedy's holding that a denial of GARA's protections
could be appealed under the collateral order doctrine. Ultimately,
the Superior Court again agreed with the trial court, referencing
the judicial interest in maintaining a narrow interpretation of the
collateral order doctrine.166 It distinguished its decision from the
Kennedy court's conclusion that a "decision on the ultimate merits
disposed of all claims and all parties in the case."'167 It also rejected Kennedy's basic premise, that "GARA entails an essential
right not to stand trial."168
The trial court cited several factors for dismissal. First, it held
that as the holder of the type certificate for the engine design, the
defendants fell within GARA's rolling provision of liability for replacement parts. 169 Second, referencing tort principles, the court
found that the plaintiffs design defect claim precluded GARA protection. The court stated that "GARA only protects manufacturers
in their capacity as manufacturers."1 70 In other words, GARA did
not protect manufacturers in a design role. The trial court also
stated that an "entity that distributes a product manufactured by
another as his own should be subject to liability as though it were
the manufacturer."' 1 71 Next, the court found a factual dispute issue over the age of the replacement engine parts.172 Finally, the
court noted the plaintiffs' request for additional time for discovery
pursuant to the misrepresentation, concealment, and withholding
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 428 (noting a second remand to the appellate court and a third
remand to the trial court).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 429. "If plaintiffs can prove these parts caused the engine to malfunction, as
Plaintiffs' experts opine, then GARA would not bar their causes of action against the Defendants. The 'rolling aspect of GARA' would apply establishing a new 18 year period for
each new part." Id.
170. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 429.
171.

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965)).

172.

Id.
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exceptions. 173 The court had previously deferred a ruling on the
discovery motion due to its summary judgment dismissal. 174
After three remands, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took the
case under consideration. The defendants argued that the lower
court erred by concluding that holding the type certificate for engine design made that manufacturer liable for parts whether or
not it actually manufactured the parts in question. 175 The lower
court's basis for interpreting GARA in this manner was unclear.
The Supreme Court immediately grasped the interpretive relevance, noting that a different interpretation would dispose of the
plaintiffs substantive arguments. 176 In presenting their arguments before the court, both the plaintiff and defendants stipulated their agreement with the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Johnson v. Jones,177 that a trial court's finding of a
genuine issue of material fact would not meet the requirements of
the federal collateral order doctrine. They agreed that Pennsyl179
vania's collateral order rule17 8 was consistent with Johnson.
The court considered the three elements of the collateral order
doctrine: separability, importance, and irreparable loss. As to
separability, the court "adopted a practical analysis recognizing
that some potential interrelationship between merits issues and
the question sought to be raised in the interlocutory appeal is tolerable."' 8 0 Citing to Third Circuit cases and Johnson, the court
reiterated that
a claim is sufficiently separate from the underlying issues for
purposes of collateral order review if it "is conceptually distinct from the merits of plaintiffs [sic] claim," that is, where,
even if "practically intertwined with the merits, [it] nonetheless raises a question that is significantly different from the
questions underlying plaintiffs claim on the merits."' 8'1
The court concluded that whether the rolling provision applied
to manufacturers who held a type certificate, but did not manufac173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433.
176. Id. at 429-30.
177. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
178. PA. R. App. P. 313.
179. Pridgen,905 A.2d at 430.
180. Id. at 433.
181. Id. (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314, and citing Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46
(Pa. 2003), and In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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ture the parts, was wholly separate from the plaintiff's underlying

claim. 182
As to the second element-importance-the court acknowledged
the political and economic forces that brought GARA into existence. 183 The court relied heavily on legislative history to support
its conclusion that the "terms of GARA ' 18 and economic revitalization of the industry satisfied the "importance" element. The
court did not refer specifically to the statutory language of GARA,
or quote directly from the statute. Rather, it noted the "federal
interests underpinning GARA . . . justify[ing] the intervention of
appellate courts in product liability cases in furtherance of the
policy of cost control."'18 5 The court acknowledged the plaintiff's
argument that other issues qualifying for collateral review focused
on constitutional immunities and entitlements, but it found the
86
defendants' "federal interest" argument more persuasive.
As to the final element-irreparable loss-the court focused on
the financial cost borne by the defendants in defending a complex
product liability action. 187 It agreed that the federal legislation
meant to "contain such costs in the public interest."' 8 8 The court's
holding suggests that public interest is served by cost containment
and gives substantial deference to GARA's balance between "pub18 9
lic, industry and individual interests."'
Consequently, the court agreed with the defendants and held
that the GARA summary judgment order should be afforded interlocutory appeal because it satisfied the three elements of the collateral order doctrine. 190 Having determined this legal question,
the court then considered the merits of the issue: whether GARA's
rolling provision extended liability to manufacturers who held
type certificates. 191
Continuing to rely heavily on legislative history, the court addressed the role that a type certificate held relative to the manufacturing process and found that a type certificate was "an essential pre-requisite to manufacture in the aviation industry."'192
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Id. at 435.
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Finding a type certificate to be a necessary element of manufacturing, the court reasoned that GARA's liability exemption to a
manufacturer "in its capacity as a manufacturer," applied to all
holders of type certificates. 193 The court found support for its conclusion in the legislative history, noting that a manufacturer did
not receive an entirely "free pass" as a result of their status as a
manufacturer. 194 Plaintiffs could still bring a civil action if a
manufacturer committed a negligent act in another role, such as
piloting or maintenance. 195 The court concluded that the types of
liabilities that would naturally arise from type certification were
the activities envisioned and protected by GARA's statute of repose.196 Returning to the purpose of GARA, the court stated "it
would wholly undermine the general period of repose if original
manufacturers were excepted from claims relief [sic] for replacement parts under the rolling provision by virtue of that status
alone." 197 Because it was undisputed that the defendants did not
manufacture or supply the replacement parts in question, GARA's
19
rolling provision did not apply. 8
Even though the court had considered the merits, it remanded
the case for a fourth time for a factual determination as to
whether there remained a material fact in dispute on the misrepresentation, concealment, and withholding exceptions. 199 Ironically, it stated "judicial efficiency" as its reason for retaining the
case and considering the merits after the third remand, but given
that a fourth remand was envisioned all along, it seems more realistic that the court wished to ensure that the trial court did not err

193. Id. (citing GARA § 2(a)).
194. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 435 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 2 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1649).
The ["in its capacity as a manufacturer"] limitation is intended to insure that
parties who happen to be manufacturers of an aircraft or a component part are
not immunized from liability they may be subject to in some other capacity.
For example, in the event a party who happened to be a manufacturer committed some negligent act as a mechanic of an aircraft or as a pilot, and such act
was a proximate cause of an accident, the victims would not be barred from
bringing a civil suit for damages against that party in its capacity as a mechanic.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638,
1649).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 436.
198. Id. at 437.
199. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 437 (ordering a fourth remand to the trial court to develop the
record on the plaintiffs misrepresentation claim).
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on the question of the legal significance of the type certificate for
rolling liability.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reasoning accepted the basic
Ninth Circuit premise that a statute of repose is akin to immunity, effectively satisfying the third Cohen prong of a decision not
reviewable on the merits. The Pennsylvania decision focused on a
purely legal question-whether being the holder of a type certificate created rolling liability-and resolved this question. In that
regard, the Pennsylvania decision is consistent with the Third
Circuit's holding that collateral review is reserved for legal issues,
not for legal issues intertwined with factual elements. While acknowledging Robinson, the Pennsylvania court's decision ostensibly broke with its reasoning. 200
However, the Pennsylvania court's remand to the trial court
might indicate a subtle acceptance of Robinson. If Pennsylvania
had first required the trial court to develop the record on whether
a factual dispute existed on the misrepresentation claim, the entire Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceeding could have been
avoided. In this regard, it seems the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's primary purpose was to correct the trial court's erroneous
interpretation of GARA on the liability of type certificate holders.
While it achieved a sensible legal interpretation, the case directly
conflicts with the Third Circuit by getting there through the collateral order doctrine. Thus, because of its apparent departure
from the Supreme Court's holdings in Digital Equipment Corp.
and Johnson, Pridgen might pose problems for Pennsylvania
courts in the future.
IV.

KENNEDY, ROBINSON, AND PRIDGEN- CAN THE DECISIONS BE

HARMONIZED?

This trio of GARA collateral review cases reveals very different
interpretations of the collateral order doctrine. The differing outcomes are not all that surprising, given the uniqueness of GARA.
GARA's primary purpose-economic revitalization of an industry-is obvious from the title. The importance of economic revitalization was repeated over and over in the testimony by GARA
supporters and in other legislative history. It was enacted at a
time when trial lawyers were viewed as out of control and responsible for unfair liability judgments. Opposition to GARA by the

200.

Id. at 434.
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Association of Trial Lawyers of America barely registered in the
legislative history. 2 1 Although other economic forces likely contributed to general aviation's downturn after 1978, the general
aviation manufacturers and trade groups successfully narrowed
the issue to one purely of liability from unfair litigation. Any
court wishing to find in favor of granting collateral review will
find substantial quote-worthy legislative history to support its

holding.

202

The Ninth Circuit holding in Kennedy strengthens GARA's protections in favor of the aircraft manufacturers. By analogizing
GARA protection to the immunity cases that qualified for collateral review, the court found that the irreparable loss prong was
satisfied. Of course, individual plaintiffs cannot dislodge the
GARA comparison to public official immunity because no individual plaintiff can claim an economic interest equal to that of an entire industry. Whereas the manufacturers successfully claimed
protected status under the "revitalization" purpose of GARA, there
is no balancing language in favor of plaintiffs. The lack of balancing language, coupled with overwhelmingly one-sided legislative
history, gave the Ninth Circuit the justification necessary to find
in favor of the manufacturers.
Although the Third Circuit in Robinson took pains not to reject
the Ninth Circuit explicitly, it plainly disagreed with that court's
reasoning. There is nothing to suggest that the Robinson court
actually was influenced by the fact that a catastrophic mechanical
failure caused the accident, but the presence of a mechanical defect certainly distinguished the Robinson accident from the types
of accidents that led to the onerous amounts of litigation prior to
GARA.
The Third Circuit's reasoning protects the bounds of the collateral review doctrine but leaves open the possibility that an erroneous legal interpretation of GARA could qualify for review in certain circumstances. 20 3 However, its rejection of the Kennedy immunity arguments sets a high standard for collateral review, and
the court never describes the circumstances that would meet all
three prongs of Cohen. Arguably, its approach treats plaintiffs
201. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has since changed its name to the
American Association for Justice. See http://www.atla.orgaboutlindex.aspx.
202. Pridgen directly quotes six times from legislative history sources in support of its
decision, see Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 429-36, whereas the Robinson court does not quote at all
from the legislative history of GARA.
203. Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2006).
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and defendants fairly by limiting GARA's full force primarily to
issues of law.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted that its decision accorded with both the Robinson and Kennedy decisions. 20 4 While it
acknowledged that it afforded more weight to Congressional intent
to "ameliorate litigation costs" 20 5 than did the Third Circuit, the
court relied on the Third Circuit's suggestion that purely legal interpretations of GARA might properly qualify for collateral review. 20 6 Because the Third Circuit found a material issue in dispute in Robinson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was able to
distinguish Pridgen as entailing a pure legal interpretation of
GARA.
This trio of cases suggests that collateral review was applied
with awareness of the facts of the cases and their underlying merits. The difficulty with this approach is that the United States
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that collateral review is to be
20 7
afforded for classes of cases, and not for fact-specific litigation.
In Digital Equipment Corp., the Supreme Court rejected a private
defendant's broad defense argument based on "the right not to
stand trial."20 8 It specifically distinguished between immunity
granted to public officials and the position of a private party. The
Court went as far as concluding that "[28 U.S.C.] § 1291 requires
courts of appeals to view claims of a 'right not to be tried' with
skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye. ' 20 9 The Court explained that an
immediate appeal of right under § 1291 would occur only when
there was an "explicit statutory or constitutional guarantee that
2 10
trial will not occur."
Because of GARA, the general aircraft manufacturers can claim
greater protections than those afforded to a product manufacturer
in virtually any other industry. Even though they cannot sensibly
lay claim to constitutional immunity, the general aircraft manufacturers are in a far better position than other product liability
defendants due to GARA's text, purpose, and voluminous legislative history. The result is that they fall somewhere between constitutionally protected entities and typical manufacturers, even
204.

Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 434 n.14, 428.

205. Id. at 434 n.14.
206. Id.
207. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).
208. DigitalEquip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 871.
209. Id. at 873 (referencing the final decision rule codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
210. Id. at 874 (quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 801
(1989)).
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though the statutory text says nothing about creating statutory
immunity beyond accepted trial practices existing at the time of
enactment.
Where does the trio of cases leave litigants? The diverging case
law will create continued uncertainty. Manufacturers will most
certainly appeal adverse summary judgment motions. In jurisdictions that have not definitively established whether a right to collateral appeal exists, the litigation process will be surely lengthened. In the Ninth Circuit and in Pennsylvania, the manufacturers' established right to collateral review establishes a procedural
hurdle for plaintiffs. As long as courts lack the ability to reject
collateral review on jurisdictional grounds, manufacturers will
certainly exploit their new-found power to slow the process of litigation, which is already lengthy. At the very least, the appeal
process will increase the amount of time spent getting a case to
trial. It may give plaintiffs counsel pause in preparing claims before trial, and will further emphasize the discovery phase in order
to sufficiently develop fact-based claims. Combined with the complexity of aircraft accident cases, the prospect of collateral review
will make a daunting process even more intimidating to plaintiffs.
What effect will the trio of decisions have on the courts? Courts
should be extremely careful with denials of manufacturers' summary judgment motions, anticipating that they will likely have to
examine and supply substantive reasoning for their decisions. At
the very least, trial courts should review the substantive issues
rather than simply denying summary judgment, and intermediate
appellate courts should look beyond the jurisdictional grounds to
find that the collateral order doctrine does not apply. As seen in
the Pennsylvania case, a trial court cannot simply dismiss a defendant's summary judgment motion and move on. A trial court
must be prepared to explain why the substantive merits of each
dispute do not deserve collateral review. In defense of the trial
court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court leap-frogged it in Pridgen
when it granted discretionary review before the trial court had
2 11
ruled on the misrepresentation exception.
Would the U.S. Supreme Court consider GARA to be an "explicit
statutory" right not to stand trial? The Digital standard is high,
and the Third Circuit has held that GARA does not meet that
211. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later granted reargument to allow the parties to
argue the substantive issues. See Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 916 A.2d 619 (Pa.
2007). It then upheld its prevision decision, although it reiterated that the plaintiffs could
still argue and prove their misrepresentation claim before the common pleas court. See id.
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standard. However, the manufacturers' argument that Congress
enacted a form of broad immunity for an entire economic industry
differentiates it from the individual private litigants discussed in
Digital. Whether the circuit split could qualify for review by the
Supreme Court likely depends on whether the collateral order doctrine migrates to other product liability areas where there are less
specific legislative protections. As it stands today, GARA is
uniquely distinguished from product liability lawsuits in general.
Non-aviation manufacturers do not have the benefit of such industry-specific protections and are unlikely to be successful in claiming a right to collateral review.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the early 1990s, the turnaround of the U.S. general aviation
industry was not a foregone conclusion. GARA has been hailed as
"an unqualified success" by the general aviation manufacturers
and their supporters. 212 GAMA reported that more than 25,000
jobs were created between the enactment of GARA and 1999.213
Based on the number of aircraft produced, the number of jobs created, and revenue growth, GARA has fulfilled the hopes of its
backers and the legislators. A GAO report in 2001 reported that
GARA was "the most significant contributor" to the revitalization
of the general aircraft industry. 214
Using collateral review, the Kennedy and Pridgen courts were
able to correct what appeared to be erroneous interpretations of
technical aspects of GARA. In Kennedy, this kept the manufacturer, Bell Helicopter, from having to withstand a full trial, saving
it the expense and time of having to wait for a final decision before
appealing. In Pridgen, it is not yet known whether a full trial will
occur, since the trial court has not yet ruled on the misrepresentation claim. Pridgen's circuitous trips up and down the Pennsylvania court system hardly achieve the judicial goal of prompt and
certain justice, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's attempt to
harmonize the differences between Kennedy and Robinson
achieved little clarity. The inability to reach consensus points to
the difficulty that future litigants and courts will face in determining whether GARA should qualify for collateral review.
212. See http://www.gama.aero/resources/productLiability/index.php ("GARA is a tiny,
three-page bill that has generated research, investment and jobs. It is an unqualified success.") (quoting Ed Bolen, President & CEO, National Business Aviation Association).
213. GAO AVIATION REPORT 2001, supra note 1, at 28.
214. Id. at 6.
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Revitalization of general aviation was already well underway
prior to Kennedy and Pridgen. Although the industry's growth
was temporarily slowed by the terrorist attacks in 2001, growth
since then has continued at a steady pace. The extra protection
afforded to the aircraft manufacturers by allowing collateral review of summary judgment decisions as a result of the Kennedy
and Pridgen decisions might be thought unnecessary for revitalization. The primary purpose of this unique piece of legislationeconomic revitalization-was achieved through its clearly written
statute of repose. Though the Ninth Circuit and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court were heavily influenced by the economic argument
underlying GARA, there will continue to be courts, such as the
Third Circuit, that find GARA neither qualifies for collateral review, nor needs it in order to fulfill the intended protections of the
statute.

